Momentum for warmaking

W. Taylor Reveley famously wrote two decades ago that while it takes just one man (the President) to start a war, it takes "two-thirds plus one" members of both houses of Congress (the number needed to override a presidential veto) to stop it.

In this light, consider the political bind that most presidents find themselves in when their generals publicly press for an expanded war effort: stand up against the general's demands, and risk being called weak; go along with the general and you at least enjoy some political cover if things go wrong.

In today's Washington Post, Richard Cohen draws historical comparisons between General McChrystal's current request for 40,000 more troops in Afghanistan, and General Westmoreland's request for more troops in Vietnam in 1967 (You may have to register to view the column):

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/26/AR2009102602645.html

Like it or not, our system of warmaking rests greatly on the shoulders of generals, and their fallibilities may have grave consequences. A great question thus arises for class discussion: Is a President --any president -- in a position to stand up against pleas made by their generals?